Learning With Differential Privacy by Sengupta, Poushali et al.
  
LEARNING WITH DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY 
Poushali Sengupta[1], Sudipta Paul[2,3], Subhankar Mishra[2,3] 
[1] University of Kalyani, Kalyani, Nadia, West Bengal – 741235 
[2] National Institute of Science, Education and Research Bhubaneswar 
Odisha, India – 752050 
[3] Homi Bhaba National Institute, Anushaktinagar, Mumbai – 400094, India 
[1] tua.poushalisengupta@gmail.com , [2] sudiptapaulvixx@niser.ac.in , [3] smishra@niser.ac.in 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Humans gain “knowledge” by inference from raw events, incidents or structured phenomenon. That implies, 
as long as it is not meaningful or inferred properly, this “raw data” doesn’t become “information” to be 
inferred that help humans to grab “knowledge” from. Our chapter refers to the definition of knowledge given 
by (Davenport et al., 1998). It states that from the perspective of an expert with respect to the particular 
experiences and principles in the right context give a proper structure to asses and integrate new raw data and 
information. This structure helps to make the transition of the data to “knowledge” - inside a proper intelligent 
mind. This phenomenon is equally applicable in the daily routine of any organization, processes, norms and 
practices. 
Raw data goes through processes to add contextual meaning in background to become “information”. These 
processes are heavily prone to defect and danger depending on the nature of the data, its sensitivity and its 
usefulness towards the organizations. One of the biggest dangers that these “information” and “raw data” can 
face is “leakage”. Leakage defined as - when an adversary knowingly disclose sensitive information for 
business purpose to harm an individual, a community or a particular target for his/her own personal 
satisfaction. The “leakage” can happen in the pre-processing as well as in the post- processing of 
“information”.  
 
These situations are not desired by any means. Some of the probable solutions are - 
• Make sure all endpoints have basic Cyber security systems. 
• Use a data backup and recovery solution using encryption-decryption system. 
• Clean up the data Storage on the IT Assets after a certain time - window  
• Limit user access privileges to only what is absolutely necessary 
• Provide Cyber security awareness training to the employees 
• Build security system inherited from the data itself that doesn’t need any kind of third-party affiliation, but 
robust and fast enough to provide enough privacy and security promise simultaneously. 
 
All of the promises except the last one needs some audit from a 3rd party who or which can be a potential attacker. 
Also, these promises need extensive monitoring from a human perspective all the time which is a tough and 
cumbersome work. The last point in the above solutions is formally known as “differential privacy” that is 
currently the default trend of privacy solution. 
The definition of “differential privacy” (DP) will be discussed in section 4 thoroughly. But as a promise, DP might 
be thought of as a restriction which filters the leakage of sensitive statistics at the time of the publication of 
aggregated information, with respect to a database, in the algorithmic level. To elaborate the above promise some 
examples are discussed below (Wikipedia – Differential Privacy), 
Government departments and agencies use DP algorithms at the time of publishing demographic and other types of 
statistical aggregated analysis report with the assurance of  the confidentiality of the survey takers and responses, 
  
Companies use DP algorithms at the time of collecting user behavior, in every step to stop leakage. This measure is 
also applicable to the internal analysts. 
In whatever way the sales numbers of a business are covered in the process of hiding, those numbers might appear 
when the same process will be done in the total calculation of a vast region that the business belongs to with a 
combinations of addition and subtraction. DP algorithms diminish those possibilities from the root itself even if the 
attackers use robust, interactive query system. 
The research and finding timeline that results in differential privacy is following - 
1950s -1960s: Statistical agencies started using electronic information processing system that resulted in the 
increase of number of data tables as well as potential attack. 
• 1977: Statistician Tore Dalenius proposedcell suppression mathematics for statistical disclosure control. 
• 2003:Computer scientists Kobbi Nissim and Irit Dinur presented the Fundamental Law of Information 
Recovery, and its key characteristics. 
• 2006: Theoretical computer scientists Cynthia Dwork, McSherry, Kobi Nissim and Smith introduced the 
concept of DP, with a mathematical definition for the privacy loss and utility associated with any result 
related to a statistical database (Dwork, 2006; Dwork & Roth, 2014). They proposed (Î, d) DP where the 
whole processes of statistical functions running on the database are not overly dependent on an 
individual’s data.  
 
The different attack models, reasons to justify them, probable solutions in academia and industry are the main 
agenda of this chapter which are discussed thoroughly in the following sections. 
 
 
 
DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY 
 
From the above discussion in the Introduction section it is evident that differential privacy comes with respect 
to the continuous development in the hope of reduction of information leakage. In the following three 
subsections, we will discuss about what differential privacy does not promise, different promises of 
differential privacy, and some useful definitions. 
Problems Regarding Privacy - Preserving Data Analysis 
There are some important problems for privacy-preserving data analysis which will be discussed here: 
• Anonymization 
Only anonymization of datasets cannot create the strong privacy. In an anonymized rich database, data 
enables “naming” an individual by the combination of the birth date, zip code, age etc. to create the 
uniqueness of the individuals. This “naming” can be used for linkage attack to match an anonymized 
dataset to a non-anonymized data set. In the year 1997, a linkage attack on Massachusetts hospital 
discharge dataset with public voter dataset was done by Prof. Latanya Sweeney and name, address, 
phone number of each persons were leaked. 
• Re-identification 
Re-identification is undesirable and risky because it reveals not only the membership of the database but 
also the compromising data records of the individuals of the dataset. 
• Large Query 
It cannot be predictable how large query would be. A set of queries or a large query can leak the personal 
information of individual of a particular database. For example, let M and N are two events and the a set 
of queries is “How many people are involved with M?”; “How many people are involved with both M 
and N?”; “How many people are involved with M for last 2 weeks?” and  “How many People are 
involved with both M and N for last 3 weeks?”. By asking these questions, one can get the particular 
answer that he/she wants to know. This situation can compromise the privacy of the individuals. 
• Query Auditing 
In some cases, one can send two or more than two such queries whereby the difference of the answers of 
these queries, he/she can get the actual answer that he/she wants to know. Privacy can be compromises in 
this way. 
• Just a few 
In some cases, the data holds privacy in such a way that it does not compromises the private data of all 
individuals except “just a few” information of individuals. Here, the data base is not fully protected. 
  
• Ordinary fact 
Revealing ordinary fact like number of times a person goes to the supermarket in a week, can 
compromises sensitive information if it is followed over time. 
In order to give a plausible solution to the above issues with the existing privacy-preserving data analysis, DP 
as a concept was plotted by Cynthia Dwork et al. in their 2006 work (Dwork, 2006). “Differential 
privacy”(Dwork & Roth, 2014) is a methodology by which public sharing of information regarding any 
dataset is restricted to describe the groups in the dataset but not any information about the individuals. DP 
addresses a paradox of learning where one can know about the useful information of the given database 
without accessing the particular sensitive information of individuals. More fundamentally, this provides a 
facility of learning overall forest data without knowing the individual trees containing the private information.  
 
The Promise of Differential Privacy 
The Fundamental Law of Information Recovery from introduction gives a start point to understand DP where 
they posed a restriction on the amount of query that might be asked by the analyst to not to reveal any private 
information by giving an overly accurate answer. DP possess an assurance inherently by the data curator that 
an individual is not prone to attack, adversely or otherwise, by providing their data for the purpose of use in 
any kind of research or survey, irrespective of connection to any other databases or data sources available at 
any corner of the world. 
If a medical database is considered for analysis, an insurance company’s view of an alcoholic’s long-term 
medical costs can be improved as they can know from the database without accessing individuals’ data 
records that drinking too much alcohol causes various liver disease, most importantly cancer. As a result, 
one’s insurance premium may rise, if the insurer knows that the particular person drinks alcohol. Here the 
medical database is deferentially private as the information of individuals are not “leaked” to the insurance 
company and it makes an impact on the participants in the survey for giving answer independently whether 
he/she drinks alcohol or not. 
DP is not an algorithm, it is a theory that ensures, a stream of outputs in arbitrary sequences of choice 
(responses to queries) is “essentially” equally likely to occur where this term “essentially” is maintained by a 
privacy parameter. The smaller the value of this parameter the better privacy occurs. This parameter is denoted 
by𝜖 . 
Different Types of Differential Privacy 
There are two types of DP. They are discussed below : 
• Local Differential Privacy (LDP): 
A technique introduced in 1965 (Warner, 1965) named as - “Randomized Response” is the basis of this kind 
of DP. The users answer the queries using only coin toss probability set. The main plus point of this simple 
model is that the distribution of the data is always stable enough even when a user suddenly changes the 
response out of the blue. There is no need to have the affiliation of a third party authorization too. As it 
always gives the answer for a forest of data instead of a single tree maintaining the above assumption, it is 
highly adopted to the industry as well as in the academia research.     
• Central Differential Privacy (CDP):  
This whole technique is depended on the trust and proficiency of the data curator (DC). The DC add random 
noise to the aggregated answer in the central part after collecting all the data from the local servers. In the 
local servers the answer to the queries are independent of each other and do not know other servers’ identity. 
Therefore all the answers are individually part of the centralized dataset. As the answers are independent and 
the DC is adding external random noise, the whole phenomenon leads to CDP.  
  
Therefore, an easy comparison can be inferred from the above discussion which is given in the Table 2. 
Table 2. Comparative discussion on LDP and CDP 
 
LDP CDP 
No place for a trusted curator, or any data storage. The data is collected from servers which are 
independent to each other and stored in a trusted 
centralized database. 
Assurance of report production entirely depended on 
the trusted individual clients. They give their 
responses using the randomized response technique 
on the coin toss set.   
The curator releases the final report applying the 
Laplace noise randomly drawn from Laplace 
distribution for hiding the presence or absence of an 
individual. 
Example: RAPPOR in google chromium project for 
google chrome search engine. 
PROCHLO implementation of ESA, ESA revisited, 
Amplification by shuffling etc. techniques. 
 
A short timeline regarding the most important inventions and discoveries in DP is given in the following figure 1. 
Figure 1. Short timeline of DP 
 
 
 
 
 
STATE OF THE ART DP TECHNIQUES ACCORDING TO TIMELINE 
 
Differential privacy is a concept which possesses a huge promise towards security. Here we will discuss about 
some related works in the industry as well as in the academia using differential privacy such as “what can we 
learn privately”, RAPPOR, PROCHLO, OUTIS, ESA, ARA etc. and compare them with each other. 
 
 
 
  
Learning with limit 
Learning problems form an important section of various computational tasks that are applied by a large 
number of computational researchers in real life. To recover these types of problems and to find the answer of 
“what can we learn privately”(Kasiviswanathan et. al, 2011), in this work they explored different approaches 
of learning concept classes as background theory, that eventually let them propose an algorithm in terms of 
samples, computations, time and interaction that holds the following promises of improvement. 
• Occam’s razor’s private version. 
• Learning privately with an efficient learner. 
• Local (randomised response) and SQ learning are equivalent. 
• Local learning in two different forms i.e. interactive and non-interactive. 
In the following subsection we will go through the preliminary background theories and theoretical result they 
derived in the process. 
 
Preliminary Background Theories 
The preliminary background theories of this work have explored differential privacy, agnostic learning, 
Probabilistically Approximately Correct (PAC) learning, SQ learning and their efficiency measure. The 
background of differential privacy will be discussed in the section 4. PAC model is the learning model that has 
the capability to access a polynomial number of labeled answers. SQ model do not access the answers directly 
whereas the learner can specify some properties on the example for which an estimate is given up to additive 
small error, of the probability that a randomly chosen example which follow the distribution D, satisfy the 
property. The PAC learning is stringently stronger than SQ learning. A brief discussion of PAC, SQ and 
Agnostic learning is given in the Table 3 below. 
Table 3: Description and mathematical formulation of different learning models. 
 
Learning Theories Description Formulas and mathematical 
expressions 
PAC (Probabilistically 
Approximately Correct)  
A concept class depending on 
some definite distribution will be 
PAC learnable using a 
hypothesis class if there exists 
such algorithm maintaining a 
polynomial time, whose output 
will produce a definite 
hypothesis from the aforesaid 
hypothesis class maintaining the 
bounds for probability of failure. 
∀𝑑𝜖ℕ, ∀𝑐𝜖𝐶𝑑 , ∀𝒳𝜖𝑋𝑑, an algorithm 
𝒜 maintaining polynomial in 
𝑑, 1 𝛼⁄ , log⁡(1 𝛽⁄ ), will give an output 
from the hypothesis class ℎ𝜖⁡ℋ , 
satisfying  
Pr[𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟(ℎ) ≤ ⁡𝛼] ⁡≥ 1 − ⁡𝛽 
over the drawn examples 𝑧𝑖 =
(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑐(𝑥𝑖)) 
Agnostic Learning It is identical to PAC theory with 
two more addition regarding 
distribution and bounds for 
probability of failure. 
∀𝑑𝜖ℕ, ∀𝑐𝜖𝐶𝑑 , ∀𝒳𝜖𝑋𝑑 × {0,1}, an 
algorithm 𝒜 maintaining polynomial 
in 𝑑, 1 𝛼⁄ , log⁡(1 𝛽⁄ ), , will give an 
output from the hypothesis class ℎ𝜖⁡ℋ 
, satisfying  
Pr[𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟(ℎ) ≤ ⁡𝑂𝑃𝑇 + 𝛼] ⁡≥ 1 − ⁡𝛽 
over the drawn examples 𝑧𝑖 =
(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑐(𝑥𝑖)) 
  
Private PAC Learning Same as PAC learning with the 
addition of privacy parameter 
∀𝜀 > 0 on the algorithm 𝒜 and 
polynomial runtime of⁡𝒜. 
∀𝑑𝜖ℕ, ∀𝑐𝜖𝐶𝑑 , ∀𝒳𝜖𝑋𝑑, ∀𝜀 > 0 ,an 
algorithm 𝒜 maintaining polynomial 
in 𝑑, 1 𝛼⁄ , 1 𝜀⁄ , log⁡(1 𝛽⁄ ), , will give 
an output from the hypothesis class 
ℎ𝜖⁡ℋ , satisfying  
Pr[𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟(ℎ) ≤ ⁡𝛼] ⁡≥ 1 − ⁡𝛽 
over the drawn examples 𝑧𝑖 =
(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑐(𝑥𝑖)) 
Private Agnostic Learning Same as Agnostic Learning with 
the addition of privacy parameter 
∀𝜀 > 0 on the algorithm 𝒜 and 
polynomial runtime of⁡𝒜. 
∀𝑑𝜖ℕ, ∀𝑐𝜖𝐶𝑑 , ∀𝒳𝜖𝑋𝑑 × {0,1}, ∀𝜀 >
0 , an algorithm 𝒜 maintaining 
polynomial in 𝑑, 1 𝛼⁄ , 1 𝜀⁄ , log⁡(1 𝛽⁄ ), 
, will give an output from the 
hypothesis class ℎ𝜖⁡ℋ , satisfying  
Pr[𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟(ℎ) ≤ ⁡𝑂𝑃𝑇 + 𝛼] ⁡≥ 1 − ⁡𝛽 
over the drawn examples 𝑧𝑖 =
(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑐(𝑥𝑖)) 
SQ (Statistical query)oracle  It takes a statistical query as an 
input over some distribution on 
labeled data with a promise to 
maintain the output within the 
tolerance of the expectations of 
the statistical query drawn from 
the distribution.  
|⁡𝒪𝒟
𝜏 (𝜙) −⁡𝔼(𝑥,𝑦)~𝒟[𝜙(𝑥, 𝑦)]| ≤ ⁡𝜏 
SQ learning A class of functions over a 
definite dimension will be SQ 
learnable using SQ oracle if there 
exists such algorithm 
maintaining a polynomial time, 
whose output will be produced as 
an element of the hypothesis 
class by asking a limited number 
of queries in the limit of 
tolerance parameter with a 
definite probability. 
With probability:1 − ⁡𝛽,  
Output a hypothesis 𝑓𝜖𝐶maintaining: 
𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑓, 𝒟) ≤ ⁡𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑓∗𝜖𝐶𝑒𝑟𝑟(𝑓
∗, 𝒟) + ⁡⁡𝛼 
Local Learning It is identical to PAC learning 
with the addition of the SQ 
learning. 
Tolerance parameter 𝜖⁡(0,1) 
Input function: 
𝑆𝑄𝑐,𝒳  
Output v maintains the SQ learning 
promise.  
Efficient private learner for 
PARITY 
It maintains PAC learn ability.  
The new introduction here is a 
class of PARITY functions 
instead of a class of concepts 
with a definite failure probability 
of
1
2
+ ⁡𝛽 
Given, 𝑐𝑟, 𝑟𝜖{0,1}
𝑑, satisfies: 
Pr[𝒜(𝑛, 𝑧, 𝜀) = 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟(ℎ) ≤ 𝛼] ⁡
≥
1
2
+ ⁡𝛽 
 
  
MASKED-PARITY It maintains the weak SQ learn 
ability with polynomial number 
of queries, error bounded below 
1
2
 
This learning concept class is 
considered when the distribution  
𝑋𝑑 is uniform over binary strings with 
length𝑑 + log𝑑 + 1 
 
In the following table 4 the symbols and description for all the aforementioned learning models is given. 
Table 4. Symbols and Descriptions for the different learning models 
Symbols Description 
C Universal concept class:{𝐶𝑑}𝑑𝜖ℕ 
𝐶𝑑 The class of concepts from 𝑋𝑑to {0,1} 
𝐷 𝑋𝑑× {0,1} 
𝒳 {𝑋}𝑑𝜖ℕ 
𝑋𝑑 The distribution of sample𝑑𝜖ℕ 
N Set of natural number 
X Set of all distributions on 𝑋𝑑 
H A class of hypothesis. 
h A hypothesis that belongs to H 
error(h) 𝑃𝑥,𝑦⁡~𝒟[⁡ℎ(𝑥) ≠ 𝑐(𝑥)] 
c A specific concept that belongs to𝑐𝜖𝐶𝑑 
β Bounds of the probability of failure 
α Desired error 
z Learning algorithm’s input. 
c(x) A particular element of a particular concept. 
A An algorithm 
 privacy budget. 
𝑐𝑟 A class of parity functions {0,1}
𝑑 → {0,1} 
Cr(x) A set of cross products of random x 
r {0,1}𝑑 
β0 Probability failure bound for z0 
z0 Neighboring input of z 
A∗ An algorithm is found by PAC learning. 
SQD A statistical query over the distribution D 
𝑆𝑄𝑐,𝒳  The statistical query oracle that takes as a input function g:𝒳 × {+1, −1} → {+1, −1} 
𝜏 Tolerance Parameter and  𝜏 ∈ (0,1) 
𝜙 Statistical Query function:𝜙 ∶ ⁡𝒳 × {0,1} → [0,1] 
𝒪𝒟
𝜏  Statistical query oracle 
n Ο(
log⁡(1 𝛽)⁄
𝜖𝛼
(𝑑 + log
1
𝛽
)) no. of examples 
𝜖 Privacy Budget 
 
For the purpose of better understanding the above discussion the classification of the learning approaches is 
given in table 5 below. The star (*) marked approaches are the authors own contribution towards different 
learning approaches.  
 
 
  
Table 5. Associated Works with PAC and SQ learning 
Learning Approach Related Learning Theories 
PAC learning PAC learning, Agnostic learning, 
Private PAC learning, Private 
Agnostic learning, Efficient private learner for PARITY *. 
SQ learning Statistical Query (SQ) oracle, 
SQ learning, Local learning, 
MASKED-PARITY* 
 
RAPPOR (Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response) 
RAPPOR (Erlingsson et. al., 2014) allows the overall client data to be studied without giving permission for 
the possibility to access the individual information, with strong privacy and great utility guarantee using 
randomized response technique in bloom filter. The main contributions of this work are: 
• RAPPOR provides a local deferentially private model. 
• It generates report by creating noise by applying bloom filter. 
• It is the first industrialized implementation of differential privacy. 
• it is a fast framework that provides strong privacy with great utility. 
The RAPPOR algorithm is in the following flow-chart in figure 2: 
Figure 2. Flow chart of RAPPOR 
 
The three types of RAPPOR are explained in the Table 6. In Table 7 all the symbols and description of 
RAPPOR is defined. 
Table 6. Explanations of three types of RAPPOR 
One-Time RAPPOR Basic RAPPOR Basic One-Time RAPPOR 
As the client itself imposed the one-
time collection in this case, the 
instantaneous randomized response 
step can be skipped here where the 
direct randomization on the client’s 
true value is robust enough to give 
the protection against longitudinal 
privacy. 
 
It is a special case of RAPPOR. 
If the report collected are small 
in size and well-defined 
enough it can be mapped to a 
single bit without using a 
Bloom Filter, reducing the 
number of hash functions in 
exchange. An easy example 
can be data on clients’ binary 
preferences where an “yes” 
means 1 and a “no” means 2. 
Here the number of effective 
bloom filters is 1. 
This is the combination of One-
time RAPPOR and Basic 
RAPPOR. A randomization step 
followed by a settled mapping to 
unique bits. 
  
Table 7. Symbols and Description for RAPPOR 
Symbols Description 
ℎ Client Value 
𝐵 First Applied Bloom filter 
𝑘 Size of the response bit string 
𝐵′ Permanent Randomized Response 
𝑆 Instantaneous Randomized Response 
𝑓, 𝑝, 𝑞 User tunable parameters 
 
Experiments in RAPPOR 
By recall precision graph it is seen that using of only two hash functions (when k and m are fixed) result in 
better utility as decrease in hash function is the cause for increase in expected recall. 
 
For the experiment, two simulated and two real world data were used to apply RAPPOR algorithm. The first 
one of simulated data was used for Basic One-time RAPPOR and the underlying distribution was found to be 
normal distribution with enough noise. The second simulated example was used to apply modified RAPPOR 
for collecting strings and it showed the exponential distribution of string frequencies. The third example was 
real world data on processes running on windows machines. In this case, the frequency of a particular process 
”BADAPPLE.COM” was estimated with 128 bit size bloom filter, 2 hash functions, 8 cohorts where q = 0.75, 
p = 0.5 and f = 0.5. The estimated frequency of BADAPPLE.COM was found to be 2.6%. The data on 
Chrome Homepages were used for last example and it was observed that the analysis of RAPPOR can 
discover URL domains of homepage, with statistical confidence, if their frequencies exceed 0.1% of the 
responding population. 
 
 
PROCHLO 
It’s a common practice now a day to monitor the user’s software activities thoroughly to provide good and 
elevated service by the companies. PROCHLO (Bittau et. al., 2017) describes architecture of a principled 
system - Encode, Shuffle, analyze (ESA) to perform such activities by maintaining higher utility through 
preserving strong privacy guarantee. Here a pipeline is used where a randomly drawn sample from users’ 
input is (Encoding :) encrypted first by pushing noise randomly, encoded by breaking the whole encrypted 
string into data fragments, then (Shuffling:) shuffled by a secret shuffler and at last (Analyzing:) the report is 
generated from the sample. 
 
Architecture: PROCHLO  
It uses the Google SGX as the secret shuffler. SGX has small memory that cannot hold the millions of data, 
and that’s why rather transferring the whole sample of users’ input directly to the shuffler, PROCHLO creates 
crowd IDs. Let, the total number of users’ input is N and the number of crowd ID is B+. Then the number of 
input having the same crowd ID is⁡𝐷+ =⁡
𝑁
𝐵+
. After getting the bunch of inputs belonging to same crowd ID, 
they are divided into fragments for encoding. 
• Step 1: Encoding 
The encoding can be done by t∗ secret shares where t∗ secret shares split a secret S∗ in a filed F into 
arbitrary S∗1, S∗2,.... so that any t∗ −1 shares can hide all information about S∗. A secret share of S∗ is 
tuple [x,ρ(x)] for randomly chosen nonzero x  F where S∗= ρ(x). Let t secret sharing encode of an 
arbitrary string m with parameter t∗ is a pair as (c,aux) where c is the cipher text which is a deterministic 
encryption under a key 𝐾𝑚= H(m) and aux be the t∗ secret shares of 𝐾𝑚. But the m is recoverable by 
using robust decryption attack with the help of aux1, aux2, ....auxt to find the 𝐾𝑚 and by using 𝐾𝑚 he/she 
can decrypt c and in this way one can create an attack to disclose the private data of individuals. 
  
So, PROCHLO use the data fragmentation for encryption. For example, consider an analysis on a 
database based upon the audiences’ ratings on movies. In this database each entryis supposed to be 
“individual” and a concern of privacy. To protect privacy, fragmentation is used here. consider a movie 
rating set is {(𝑚0, 𝑟0),((𝑚1, 𝑟1),(𝑚2, 𝑟2)}. Where 𝑚i (i=0:2) is the name of the ith movie and 𝑟i (i=0:2)is 
the rating of the ith movie. Now, the elements of this rating set can be encoded as their pairwise 
combinations like〈(𝑚0, 𝑟0), (𝑚1, 𝑟1)〉, 〈(𝑚0, 𝑟0), (𝑚2, 𝑟2)〉and 〈(𝑚1, 𝑟1), (𝑚2, 𝑟2)〉 whereeach pair will be 
transmitted to the secret shuffler for the independent shuffling. The shuffler is trusted but always curious 
about the private data of individuals. Here, for generating the crowd IDs and encryption, it is hard for the 
shuffler to guess about the private information of any particular individual. 
 
• Step 2: Shuffling 
In the next part of this pipeline, this shuffler performs four tasks and those are anonymization, shuffling, 
thresholding and batching. 
o Anonymization - Anonymization is created by striping metadata which is not enough for privacy. 
o Shuffling- For this, the SGX do the oblivious shuffling. Based on Melbourne shuffle technique, 
PROCHLO introduces the Stash shuffle that actually improves the all previous problems. Here, 
consider B∗ input and outputs buckets each having𝐷”⁡ =
𝑁
𝐵∗
 items. At first, 𝐷”⁡ items of each input 
buckets are random shuffled with B ∗ −1 bucket separator. The shuffles determine which items will 
fall into which target output bucket. Then for every output bucket, as long as there is still room in the 
maximum C items to output, the items from input bucket are read, decrypted and deposited to the 
output bucket. If the bucket is full of C items, then the next items will go to the Stash and start waiting 
for the next target bucket. Finally, if some output bucket still not filled with C quota, then they are 
filled with dummy variables. After all input buckets has been processed, the Stash may leave over 
with some items. These items are drained by filling extra K items per output buckets. At the end of 
this phase, K is set to be 
𝑆∗
𝐵∗
 where S∗= stash space and B∗= bucket number. Now, all the items in 
output buckets are re-encrypted, shuffled and dummy items are filtered out from every bucket. Each 
bucket drops 𝑑′’ item in this phase. After that, 𝐷”⁡ items are forwarded as output at a time. 
▪ The phase proceeds in a sliding window w buckets of intermediate items. At the time of 
shuffling, there are two secret shufflers. The encoder computes (𝑔𝑟, ℎ∗
𝑟, 𝜇) where (g,h∗) is 
the key of shuffler 2 and r is a random value. Shuffler 1 is a blind shuffler that creates a secret 
 α′for each tuple where α′𝜖Ζ𝑝and compute (𝑔
𝑟𝛼, , (ℎ∗
𝑟⁡.⁡⁡𝜇)𝛼
′
) 
▪ After that, the shufflers 1 batch the data, shuffles and forward the blinded items to shuffler 2. 
Shuffler 2 uses its private key that is the secret x∗ such that h∗= gx∗ on input (u,v) to compute 
𝑣
𝑢
𝑥∗and recover µα0 = H(𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑑𝐼𝐷)𝛼
′
It works with crowd ID that are already hashed and has 
raised to a secret power𝛼′. With the blind crowd ID, shuffler 1 cannot do the dictionary 
attack, since it does not know the secret key of the shuffler 2, whereas shuffler2 also cannot 
do such attack as it has not any idea about the secret 𝛼′ of shuffler 1. So, at the time of 
shuffling, privacy is maintained. 
o Thresholding- Even stripped and shuffled data may identify a client by uniqueness and to prevent this 
the shuffler do thresholding by generating crowdID. 
 
o Batching- After that, the shuffler forwards the data to the analyser infrequently, in batches. 
• Step 3: Analyzing 
The analyzer decrypts, stores and aggregate those data comes from the shuffler. The analyzer’s output is 
considered public. Analyzer uses the PINQ, FLEX or the systems such as Airavat to maintain the final 
protection of user’s privacy. 
All the symbols and description of PROCHLO are given in the following table 8:  
 
  
Table 8: Symbols and Description of PROCHLO 
Symbols Description 
𝑆∗ Secret string. 
𝑡∗ Number of secret shares. 
F Field contains all the secret strings. 
𝐾𝑚 Key. 
 c Cipher text. 
𝑎𝑢𝑥𝑖 𝑖
𝑡ℎ Number secret sharing among all t shares. 
N Total number of user inputs. 
B* Number of  buckets 
𝐷" Number of outputs each output bucket has. 
C Maximum quota of each target bucket. 
𝑆∗ Stash. 
K Number of extra elements per output bucket. 
𝑑′ Number of items dropped by each output bucket. 
(u, v) Input from users. 
𝐵+ Number of crowdID. 
𝐷+ Number of inputs having same crowdID. 
 
Experiments: PROCHLO  
It performs four experiments with Crowd, Secret Crowd, No-Crowd and Blinded-Crowd to privately learn word 
frequencies on sample of size 10K,100K and 1M. It is seen that, if data with No-Crowd are transferred to the 
pipeline, it will have no privacy and highest utility whereas if we pass the data with Crowd , then the privacy will 
be improved but not so much. By creating secret Crowd, this problem can be recover, but still the result is not 
satisfactory so much. all of this problem can be removed by applying blinded Crowd to the data which provides 
strong privacy guarantee with great utility. 
PROCHLO provides much better utility than RAPPOR while maintaining strong privacy guarantee. Here, data 
have less noise than RAPPOR reports, so the utility becomes higher. PROCHLO not only offers good balance 
between utility and privacy, it introduces both new cryptographic primitives and a new algorithm of oblivious 
shuffling. PROCHLO is relatively simple, easy to understand system and also has the straightforward 
realization of the ESA structure that minimizes trust issues. 
Amplification by Shuffling 
A important task in data analysis is the monitoring of the statistical properties of the data in a manner that 
requires repeated computation the entire data set which is involved and that type of monitoring can directly or 
indirectly harm the data by exposing private information about sensitive attribute of user. In case of 
centralized differential model, the response should be stable while the neighboring data set differs from n 
rows. So, the centralized differential model provides better privacy than the LDP model. 
Inspired by differential privacy under continuous observation, Amplification by Shuffling (Erlingsson et. al., 
2019) provides an algorithm that gives high accuracy online monitoring on users’ input in LDP model whose 
privacy cost is poly-logarithmic in number of changes in users’ input and it shows how LDP guarantees about 
privacy protection while doing online monitoring even when the users report repeatedly, over multiple 
timesteps, and whether they report on the highly correlated value, on the same value or independently drawn 
values. This privacy amplification technique shows that any permutation-invariant algorithm satisfying 
differential privacy will satisfy O(𝜖√log (
1
𝛿
) , 𝑛 ) central differential privacy. 
 
 
  
Mathematical Model and Lower bound  
Let, we want to know the number of times a software is used by n users at the time horizon d and the input is 
taken repeated time at the time point t [d]. Consider a population of n users reporting a boolean value about 
their state at each time period t𝜖⁡[𝑑] where [d]= (d1, d2,.....) and d is the power of 2. Sti = {Sti[1], Sti[2], ......., 
Sti[d]} denotes the ith user’s state at the time point t𝜖⁡[𝑑]and they can change their input at most k times. Let, 
𝑥𝑖  ={ 𝑥𝑖[1], 𝑥𝑖[2], ....., 𝑥𝑖[d]} denotes the changes by the ith user at the time point t𝜖⁡[𝑑]. Then, Sti[d] = 
∑ 𝑥𝑖[𝑙]𝑙𝜖[𝑡]  and  𝑓𝑡 =⁡∑ 𝑥𝑖[𝑡]
𝑛
𝑖=1 will be the running count or marginal sum. Now, h is the hth  level of the 
balanced binary tree and Hi be the number of nodes of the hth level of the ith user’s tree and it is denoted 
by𝐻(ℎ𝑖)𝑓𝑜𝑟ℎ𝜖[log2 d+1]. after that, k and c are initialised as k=0 and c=0 , d and k∗ is set up and the input xt 
is taken. Update𝑥𝑡 ⁡, 𝑡, 𝜖at each time step and modify k and c where the process is  differential private and𝑡 ≤
𝑑, 𝑥𝑡 ∈ {−1,0,1}. If 𝑥𝑡 ≠ 0, k= k+1, and when k reaches k∗, c takes the value of xt. Otherwise, if c=0 and t is 
divisible by 2h-1, u take random value from {-1,1}, else b takes 
value from 2× [𝐵𝑒𝑟 (
𝑒
𝜖
2
1+𝑒
𝜖
2
) − 1] and u takes (b × c). Now for response, thealgorithm creates a𝑇𝑠𝑢𝑚 [ℎ,
𝑡
2ℎ−1
] = ⁡∑ 𝑢𝑖,𝑡𝑖,ℎ,𝑡=ℎ and𝑓?̅? = (
𝑒
𝜖
2+1
𝑒
𝜖
2−1
) . 𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑑.∑ 𝑇𝑠𝑢𝑚[h,i] [ℎ, 𝑖].Here 𝑇[ℎ, 𝑖]is the sum of independent random 
variables that come from the range [-1, 1]. Now, 
∀[ℎ, 𝑖]:⁡|𝑇[ℎ′𝑖] − 𝐸[𝑇[ℎ, 𝑖]]| ≤ ⁡ 𝑐𝜖√𝑛
𝑙𝑜𝑔
2𝑑
𝛽
𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑑
, where, 𝑐𝜖 = (
𝑒
𝜖
2+1
𝑒
𝜖
2−1
) 
Byscaling with  𝑐𝜖
′𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑑and multiplying by log2 d we get, 
∀𝑡𝜖[𝑑]: |𝑓𝑡 −⁡𝑓?̅?| ⁡≤ ⁡ 𝑐𝜖𝑘(log2 𝑑)
3
2√𝑛 log2
2𝑑
𝛽
 
   
Now, the algorithm𝐴𝑙𝑑𝑝
(𝑖)
 and 𝐷 =⁡𝑥𝑖:𝑛are used where𝐴𝑙𝑑𝑝
(𝑖)
: 𝑆(1)× 𝑆(2)× ........ × D → 𝑆(𝑖)be the input from ith user. 
After taking input 𝑥1, 𝑥2,,......, 𝑥𝑛,  a random number I is chosen from [1:n] and then the first element of the data is 
swapped with the Ith element. Now, the local randomiser is operated with the data set. Let π be any permutation of 
the set [1:n], then π(D) ← {xπ(1), xπ(2), ....., xπ(n)}. After Local Randomisation, again a shuffling is done where zi 
takes the value (z1:(i-1) , xi) and the generated report is {zπ(1), zπ(2), ....., zπ(n)}. 
Let, T is sampled from the distribution of I conditioned on 𝑍1:𝑛 =𝑆1:𝑛. Then, 
 
𝑃(𝑍1:𝑛=⁡𝑆1:𝑛|𝑇=𝑖)
𝑃(𝑍1:𝑛=⁡𝑆1:𝑛|𝑇=𝑗)
⁡≤ ⁡ 𝑒2.𝜖  
Now, we can write 
𝑃(𝑇 = 𝑖|𝑍1:𝑛 =⁡𝑆1:𝑛) = ⁡
𝑃(𝑍1:𝑛 =⁡𝑆1:𝑛|𝑇 = 𝑖). 𝑝(𝑇 = 𝑖)
𝑃(𝑍1:𝑛 =⁡𝑆1:𝑛)|
⁡≤ ⁡
1
𝑛
𝑒2.𝜖 
Because T is uniform over [n] and𝑝 = ⁡𝑝′ =⁡
1
𝑛
. Applying privacy amplification by shuffling and advanced 
composition theorem we get 
 𝑛𝜖(𝑒𝜖 − 1) ≤
65
64
𝑛(𝜖1)
2 ≤
2
3
𝜖0√
𝑙𝑜𝑔
1
𝛿
𝑛
 
Where , 𝜖 < 𝜖1√2𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑔
1
𝛿
+ 𝑛𝜖1(𝑒
𝜖 − 1) and 𝜖1 ≤
8𝜖
𝑛
⁡ , 𝜖0 ≤⁡
1
2
 , 𝛿 is the small distance between two datasets. 
Each set of 𝑛′users for which the result is applicable are still be guaranteed by a factor √𝑛′reduction in the 
centralised privacy model for the worst possible case. Here shuffling after the local randomisation technique 
satisfies(𝜖, 𝛿)differential privacy at index i in the central model where 𝜖 = 12𝜖0√
𝑙𝑜𝑔
1
𝛿
|𝑆|
 ; 𝑆 ⊆ |𝑛| such that 
𝑖, 𝑗𝜖𝑆, 𝐴𝑙𝑑𝑝
(𝑖)
=⁡𝐴𝑙𝑑𝑝
(𝑗)
 
 
 
  
Table 9. Symbols and Description for Amplification of Shuffling 
Symbols Description 
t Time Point 
d Time Horizon 
Sti 𝑖𝑡ℎ user’s state at the time point t 
𝑥𝑖 Changes by 𝑖
𝑡ℎ user. 
𝑓𝑡 Running count 
𝑓?̅? Expected running count 
𝐻(ℎ𝑖) Number of nodes at the ℎ
𝑡ℎ level of tree T 
𝑇(ℎ, 𝑖) sum of independent random variables that come from the range [-1, 1] 
D Database 
𝜋 Any permutation of the set [1: n] 
𝜖 Privacy budget o the data set. 
𝜖1 Privacy budget of neighboring data set D’  
𝜖0 Privacy budget of  𝐴𝑙𝑑𝑝
(𝑖)
 
𝑆(𝑖) Range space of 𝐴𝑙𝑑𝑝
(𝑖)
 
𝐴𝑙𝑑𝑝
(𝑖)
 ith local differentially private algorithm 
 
The result of Amplification by Shuffling is encouraging, and it secures the differential privacy in central 
differential model and make the stable response for differing single input in two data sets. But this algorithm 
gives very poor response for longitudinal data. This formalisation assumes that the user population to be static 
which does not compared to real world. 
OUTIS 
This paper provides a framework that provides an accuracy guarantee just like CDP model (Chowdhury et. al., 
2019) without any trusted data collector. Here crypt employs two non- colluding semi-trusted server AS 
(Analytic Server) and CSP (Cryptographic Service Provider )that run differential privacy on the encrypted 
data given by the data owner. 
Cryptographic Primitives: OUTIS 
 In their paper they used four cryptography schemes. They are explained in the following –  
• Linear Homomorphic Encryption (LHE) - This scheme consists of three stages i.e. Key generation, 
Encryption and Decryption on the basis of the group (ℳ,+). In the first stage a user tunable security 
parameter K is being passed as input in the pipeline which outputs a pair of keys. Those are secret and 
public keys - (𝑆𝑘 , 𝑃𝑘).  In the second stage, using the public key  𝑃𝑘 a randomized algorithm encrypts a 
message 𝑚 ∈ ℳ to 𝑐. The third and the last part decrypt 𝑐 from the last stage using 𝑆𝑘 to recover the 
plaintext message 𝑚 deterministically. 
• Labelled Homomorphic Encryption (LabHE) – By the introduction of pseudo-random function every 
LHE scheme can be changed to LabHE. The LabHE scheme also has the ability to multiply two LabHE 
ciphers.  
• They have used two more primitives too. Those are “𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡⨁ “and “Secure computation using 
garbled circuit”. 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟⁡⨁⁡is mainly used for the repetition purpose. In the later scheme, for two 
private inputs from two parties, no party can learn more than 𝑓(𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡1, 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡2)  for a function 𝑓. This is 
an inherent generator scheme using garbled input in every steps. 
 
Architecture: OUTIS 
The algorithm is given below- 
• Setup Phase:  
The owner initializes the privacy budget 𝜖𝛽 for CSP and stores it in CSP’s privacy engine module. Then the 
CSP key manager produces a pair of keys(𝑆𝑘 , 𝑃𝑘).  For labHE and publishes 𝑃𝑘 stores𝑆𝑘. 
  
• Data Collection Phase: 
 In this phase, data owner encrypts and encodes his data with the help of data encryption technique and data 
encoder and then sends the encrypted and encoded data to As and after that, data owner gets offline 
completely. As, aggregates the data into a singleencrypted database D by aggregator module. 
• Program Execution Phase: 
 Here AS executes data analyst provided crypt programs that accesses sensitive data by various 
transformation operators like Cross Product, Project, Filter, Count, Group By Count, Group By Count 
Encoded, Count Distinct etc and measurement operators like Laplace, Noisy Max etc which are DP 
operations to create noisy answer. Measurement operators require interaction with CSP as they need to 
decrypt the data and also to check whether the privacy budget is exceeded or not. These functions can be 
done by the CSP’s data decryption and privacy budget modules. 
 
 
Table 10. Symbols and Descriptions for subsection OUTIS 
Symbol Description 
𝜖𝛽 Privacy budget for cryptographic service provider 
𝑆𝑘 Secret key 
𝑃𝑘 Private key 
c Cipher text 
m Message to be encrypted 
?̅? Aggregated data 
 
 
The first two phases occur exactly once at the beginning and every subsequent program are handled by the 
corresponding program execution phase. 
Experiments: OUTIS 
For experiments they use a schema database <Age, Gender, Native Country, Race> and shows 7 
cryptographic examples over it. They uses the crypt program p1 to find the cumulative distribution of age 
where the first step is to compute 100 ranges queries and the ith query computes the number of persons having 
the age 𝜖 [0,i] in ?̅?with privacy guarantee 𝜖𝑖 then they applied a sequence of transformation operators in each 
range of queries and all of these operators have stability bound 1. For this, the resultant range query has a 
sensitivity upper bound 1. In this way, the subsequent measurement operator Laplace takes the privacy budget 
𝜖𝑖and sensitivity ∆ = 1. After looping over 100 ranges, p1 gives a noisy plain text ?̂?= {𝑐1̂,𝑐2̂,....,𝑐100̂ } and at 
the end of the program the privacy budget is ∑ 𝜖𝑖
100
𝑖=1 . 
 
ARA (Aggregated RAPPOR and Analysis for Central Differential Privacy) 
The main aim of ARA (Paul et. al., 2020) is trying to produce a bridge to keep best of both the worlds in terms 
of LDP and CDP, which is a software approach, comparatively less expensive, fast with less complexity in the 
analysis and overall method.  
The main contributions of ARA are following – 
• The promises of DP are maintained. 
• Fast enough analysis phase (Around 1.5 hours for 1000 users times 100 loops of analysis) 
• Correct identification of the highest occurred true value every time with varying achievement. 
• Simple probabilistic analysis method in comparison to OUTIS or PROCHLO. 
 
 
Methodology and Experiments: ARA  
ARA collects data after cloning the RAPPOR code from the Google repository of GitHub by running it 100 
times to make their own database using the generated RAPPOR reports. It only uses ten true values for 
convenience where RAPPOR has used 100 true values.  
  
In the first step the sampling is done in 100, 1000, 10000, 20000, 25000 samples taking at a time randomly 
from the created dataset without any repetition. Then the TF-IDF value is calculated with the formula given in 
the table 11. The two achievements from this step are – 
• No more than ⌈𝑘 2⁄ ⌉ + 1 positions can grab “on bit”s. Here, 𝑘 = 32. 
• Constant values for 17 bit positions are calculated for the “on” bits. 
These values are now predefined for the next step and securely preserved by the trusted data curator. 
 
Table 11. The 17 constants value retrieved using continuous sampling on the RAPPOR reports 
 
Number of ‘on bit’ in the string Constant Value 𝓒𝒗(v ranged from 1 - 
17) 
1 1.20201279 
2 1.0927389 
3 0.993399 
4 0.90309 
5 0.80618 
6 0.727 
7 0.660052 
8 0.60206 
9 0.550907 
10 0.50515 
11 0.4637573 
12 0.425969 
13 0.3912066 
14 0.3590219 
15 0.329059 
16 0.30103 
17 0.274701 
 
Source: Paul et. al., 2020 
 
In the second step, the weighted sum for the prr and irr strings is being calculated using the formulas given in 
the table. These sums are stored for a minimum time for the purpose of experiment . 
The last step is the testing phase, where the RAPPOR reports are being drawn again randomly from the testing 
portion of the created database and the weighted sum is being calculated and matched against the preserved 
results in the second step. The formulas of each steps can be consulted from the original ARA (Paul et. al., 
2020) paper and the description of the terms used in those formulas are given in the following table 12. 
 
Table 12. Symbols and Descriptions for ARA 
Symbol Description 
𝑇𝐹(𝑡", 𝑑∗) Term Frequency 
t” Term 
d* Document in which the term t” has occurred 
𝑓𝑡",𝑑∗ Frequency of occurrence t” in d* 
𝐼𝐷𝐹(𝑡", 𝑑∗) Inverse document frequency 
1 + |𝑑∗ϵ𝐷∗ ∶ ⁡ 𝑡"𝜖𝑑∗| Total number of documents in the corpus 
  
N Number of documents where t” has appeared 
W Weighted sum 
𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑟 The count of ‘on bit’ in the prr string 
𝐶𝑖𝑟𝑟 The count of ‘on bit’ in the irr string 
V Cohort value 
𝐶𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑟  Value taken from the 𝒞𝑣 in the Table 11 
𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑟𝑟  Value taken from the 𝒞𝑣 in the Table 11 
 
The main drawbacks of ARA are that the accuracy is not more than 52.28% on an average and the detection 
ability of the second major true value is poor. 
 
Encode, Shuffle, Analyze, Privacy Revisited: Formalization and Empirical Evaluation 
In this paper (Erlingsson et. al., 2020) they tried to bridge all their previous works starting from RAPPOR, 
PROCHLO – an implementation of ESA (encode, shuffle, analysis) till  Amplification by shuffling, with the 
aim to give a proper algorithm that works equally good in both the LDP and CDP environment with an 
extensive experimental results using MNIST and CIFER-10 datasets. The key techniques they talked about 
here are the following -   
• Anonymity 
• Reporting with the preservation of privacy 
• Sketch based encryption and its limitation 
• Cons of fragmentation 
• Cons of shuffling 
 
Background Theorem 
In the proposed algorithm here, data are collected from the users first and then they are encoded by one of the 
techniques such as one-hot encoding, attribute fragmentation, report fragmentation and sketch-based encoding 
and all of these schemes produce reports with localized differential privacy guarantee. Each and every 
encoding system have their own pros and cons too. After completing encoding, the LDP reports then are being 
shuffled by k-shuffler to aggregate in the next step. After that the algorithm of amplification by shuffling is 
applied here and the final reports are generated which hold centralized and local differential privacy guarantee 
equally. The parts of this algorithm is discussed below -  
• One-Hot Encoding 
The type of encoding has strong impact on utility of the differentially private algorithm. Let D be 
dictionary of elements and id D is not too large, then a data input x can be encoded by one-hot encoding 
where each data record x will hold an element in D.But when the D is large enough, it is not a suitable 
idea to apply one-hot encoding whereas sketching algorithm can be used. 
• Sketch-Based Reports 
The main idea of this scheme is to reduce a given domain {0,1}𝐾
′
to {0,1}𝑘
′
, 𝑘′ < 𝐾′via hashing and then 
use locally private protocols to operate over the domain of size 𝑘′. To avoid significant loss due to 
hashing, it is performed by multiple independent hash function. But it is observed that sketching is not a 
requirement for practical deployment in regimes with local differential privacy. 
• Attributes Fragments 
In this case, each data record x is encoded as a binary vector with k or fewer bit set and each k vector 
coordinate is called attributes where x = Σxi, xi is one-hot encoded vector. Now, either each xi splitting 
privacy budget accordingly go through the randomizer R∗ or one of the xi is drawn as the sample and 
spend the entire privacy budget to send is to R∗ which is a randomly chosen randomizer. There are two 
  
types of local randomizer, one holds the algorithm for replacement privacy guarantee and another holds 
the algorithm for removal privacy guarantee. 
o Replacement LDP 
An algorithm R*:D → S is a replacement (𝜖, 𝛿) deferentially private local randomiser if for 
all S ⊆ S and for all 𝑥, 𝑥′𝜖𝐷: 𝑃[𝑅∗(𝑥)𝜖𝑆] ≤ 𝑒𝜖𝑃[𝑅∗(𝑥′)𝜖𝑆] + ⁡𝛿 
 
 
 
o Generalized Removal (𝜖, 𝛿) DP 
A randomized algorithm M:𝐷𝑛 → S is a replacement satisfies removal (𝜖, 𝛿)- differential 
privacy if there exist an algorithm 𝑀′: 𝐷𝑛 × 2[𝑛] ⟶ 𝑆with the following properties: 
▪ for all 𝐷𝜖𝐷𝑛,𝑀′(𝐷, [𝑛]) is identical to M(D) 
▪ for all 𝐷𝜖𝐷𝑛and 𝐼𝜖[𝑛],𝑀′(𝐷, 𝐼)⁡⁡depends only on elements D with indices I. 
▪ for all S⊆ S,𝐷𝜖𝐷𝑛and I, I’⊆ [n]where we have that |I∆I’|=1, 
P [ 𝑀′(𝐷, 𝐼)⁡⁡𝜖S] ≤⁡𝑒𝜖𝑃[⁡𝑀′(𝐷′, 𝐼′)⁡⁡𝜖𝑆]⁡+ δ 
 
o Removal LDP 
An algorithm R*:D → S is a removal (𝜖, 𝛿) differentially private local randomiser if exist a 
random variable R0 such that for all S ⊆ S and for all 𝑥𝜖D , 𝑒−𝜖P[ 𝑀′(𝐷, 𝐼)⁡⁡𝜖S] ≤
⁡𝑒𝜖𝑃[⁡𝑀′(𝐷′, 𝐼′)⁡⁡𝜖𝑆]⁡+ δ 
 
After sampling each z from{𝑥𝑖 ∶ 𝑖𝜖⁡[𝑘]} , it is seen that sending each attribute of z independently to LDP 
randomiser that produce anonymous reports, is advantageous. 
• Report Fragments 
Here, a sequence of LDP reports which is generated by multiple independent applications of the 
randomizer R∗ to x has come and each such report is called report fragment containing less information 
than the entire LDP report sequence. Thus, it improves privacy guarantee more. 
After completing the encoding parts, the fragments are sent to the shuffler. There are k secret shufflers. Each 
fragment chooses one shuffler randomly and each attribute go to the separate channel of the selected shuffler. 
Then the secret shuffling is done and shuffle data came where one cannot guess which data fragments come 
from which shuffler. In this way, the data remains deferentially private. After shuffling the aggregate is 
calculated and at last amplification by shuffling technique is applied to make the whole process centrally 
deferentially private. 
 
USEFUL BACKGROUND ON DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY 
To understand the fundamental theory of DP one need to goes through proper steps. These steps are following: 
 
• Understanding the background probability theorems to define DP 
This step consists of learning about probability simplex, randomized algorithm, distance 
between adjacent databases, definition of differential privacy derived from the afore mentioned 
concepts and finally the intuition of post processing through the definitions and proposition 
mentioned. All of these are explained in the Appendix 1.  
 
• Understanding the tools to build the DP algorithm 
This step provides the definition, remarks, theorems and claims about probabilistic tools like 
additive Chernoff bound, multiplicative Chernoff bound, Azuma’s inequality, Stirling’s 
approximation. It also helps to understand how to introduce noise at the time of data collection 
or structured surveys by enlightening us on the concepts of Randomized response, Laplace 
mechanism, Exponential mechanism etc. All of these are explained in the Appendix 2.  
 
  
• Understanding the way to use those tools to build a DP algorithm 
The final step helps us to actually build a DP algorithm for real purpose by letting us understand 
about the Composition theorem, its technicalities, definition, advancement, Sparse vector 
technique, its algorithm, theorems, definition etc. All of these are explained in the Appendix 3. 
 
To understand if a proposed DP algorithm is good or bad, we need to calculate its accuracy and utility 
(Alvim et. al., 2011). The flow of utility and accuracy inside the DP system is given in the following 
figure 3. The definitions are explained in Appendix 3. 
 
Figure 3. Leakage and utility workflow using differential privacy 
Source: Alvim et. al., 2011 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPE 
Industries are becoming heavily dependent and invested in data. In a lot of situations, user experience can be 
improved based on the meta-data we learn from what other users are doing. Few examples are trending words, 
relevant suggestions, battery hungry websites, popular emojis. However, answering these questions needs 
personal data of the users. 
Differential privacy technique helps us comprehend what users are doing, while protecting the privacy of 
individual users. It helps us learn about the user groups without learning about the members of the group. It 
makes sure that data cannot be reproduced even by the organization that is collecting the data. It achieves so 
with the idea that a biased statistical noise is enough to disguise a user’s data and when aggregated over large 
users, can still give us insight on the community. With increase in cyber-attacks as well as data harvesting; 
differential privacy is the only ethical way of data collection. 
In this chapter, we discuss differential privacy with its history and origin as well as the current state of the art 
methods. We discuss the architecture or the model of the various algorithms adopting the differential privacy 
technique along with the required theorems, proofs and experiments to justify their privacy and utility. We 
believe this chapter will communicate the audience about the current status of this research area as well as 
engage the readers with exploring research directions in the area of differential privacy. 
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ADDITIONAL READING: 
This Section contains some of the current developments on Differential Privacy.  They are following: 
• Continuous Release of Data Stream Under Both Centralized and Local Differential Privacy: 
In their work (Wang et al.,2019) propose an exponential mechanism with quality function, along with two 
algorithms ToPS (threshold optimizer, perturber and smoother) and ToPL ( ToPS applied in LDP) which 
provides the solution regarding the publishing of a stream of real valued data satisfying DP. ToPL is the 
first LDP algorithm for streaming data and it is the hierarchical version of traditional PAK algorithm 
(Dwork et al., 2010). ToPL is a method designed with the framework of ToPS for outputting streaming 
data in LDP. Here, as user perturbs their values before sending to the server, there is no need to trust the 
server. Threshold optimizer uses frequency estimation instead of applying exponential mechanism (as user 
has local view) which is less accurate than EM (exponential mechanism). After achieving optimal 
threshold parameter, the user report is first truncated then the consistent noise is applied. As the reports are 
unbiased themselves, to answer a range of queries, this algorithm doesn't use the smoother here. But they 
  
use the PAK setting in threshold optimizer assuming that the distribution stays same with further 
information like data changes slowly or regularly, which is a drawback. 
• A Privacy Preserving Randomized Gossip Algorithm via Controlled Noise Insertion: 
This work (Hanzely et al., 2019) introduces a duel algorithm based on average consensus (AC) that 
provides iteration complexity bound and performs extensive numerical experiments while protecting the 
information regarding initial value stored in the node. For a particular graph structure, at first the initial 
value is provided after adding noise to the system for propagating across the network, but in the following 
iteration , the previously added noise is removed and the new noise with smaller magnitude is applied to 
ensure the convergence to the true average that maximise the utility of the system obviously.  
• A General Approach to Adding Differential Privacy to Iterative Training Procedures: 
This work (McMahan et al., 2018) introduces an algorithm with the modular approach to minimize the 
changes on training algorithm by various configuration strategies of privacy mechanism which is applied 
to heterogeneous set of vectors (like gradients of different layers of DNN, matrices, batch normalization 
parameters with the different properties). The algorithm provides an integrated privacy mechanism that 
differs in granular privacy guarantee offered and the method of privacy accounting, where, after choosing 
the subset from the training data set with a probability parameter, using statistical queries - the privacy 
mechanism containing noises is applied to each collected aggregates and the accounting procedure is used 
to compute a final (ε, δ)- differential privacy guarantee with a good balance between privacy and utility. 
The major drawbacks are, no utility bound is given to justify the good balance between privacy and utility, 
the distribution is defined over a finite domain, the source of randomness is assumed to be guaranteed and 
computationally secured and lastly they leave open the task of developing a provable floating point 
implementation using Laplace mechanism on DP-SGD and iterating it into a ML Library. 
• Capacity Bounded Differential Privacy: 
This paper (Chaudhuri et al.,2019) introduces the capacity bounded differential privacy where the 
adversary that distinguishes the output distribution is assumed to be not bounded in computational power. 
This work models adversaries using restricted f divergence between the probability distribution and study 
various properties of the definition and algorithm that satisfy them. They also show that the Laplace and 
Gaussian mechanisms are also giving better privacy by applying this new algorithm. 
• BUDS: Balancing Utility and Differential Privacy:  
This work (Poushali Sengupta et al.,2020) introduces a mechanism along with Iterative Shuffling that 
ensures a good balance between utility and privacy guarantee of the dataset. The whole mechanism can be 
decomposed into two parts: Application of Query analysis and Iterative Shuffling (IS). The main drawback 
of this work is: one hot encoding is used for encoding which is a problem for big dimensional data set. 
Also proper architecture of Query Function is not provided here. 
 
Key terms and Definitions: 
This section is divided into four parts. The first part contains the key terms and the following three parts 
contains the necessary definitions and theorems for the learning of differential privacy. 
Key terms: 
PAC Learning, SQ Learning, Private PAC Learning, Private SQ Learning, Randomized Response, Differential 
Privacy, RAPPOR, ESA, ARA, BUDS 
Definitions and Theorems for the first step: 
In the second part we will discuss some useful definitions and background theorems that work for the first 
learning step of DP discussed in the useful background on differential privacy section in alphabetical order as 
instructed by the publisher (Dwork et. al., 2014). 
 
Differential Privacy  
A randomized algorithm ℳ with domain ℕ|𝒳|𝑖𝑠⁡(𝜖, 𝛿) - deferentially private if for all S ⊆ Range(ℳ) and for all 
𝑥, 𝑦𝜖ℕ|𝒳| such that ||𝑥 − 𝑦||1 ≤ 1 will follow: 
𝑃(ℳ(𝑥)𝜖𝑆) ≤ exp(𝜖) 𝑃(ℳ(𝑦)𝜖𝑆) + 𝛿 
  
where the probability space is over the coin flips of the mechanism ℳ . If δ = 0, we say that ⁡ℳ⁡𝑖𝑠𝜖 - 
deferentially private. 
Distance between two adjacent databases 
The ℓ1norm of a database 𝑥 is denoted by ||𝑥||1 and is defined to be  
||𝑥||1 =⁡∑|𝑥|𝑖
|𝜒|
𝑖=1
 
The ℓ1 distance between two databases 𝑥𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑦is ||𝑥 − 𝑦||1 where the later term denotes the measure of how 
many records differ between 𝑥𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑦. 
 
 
Explanation of Different DP 
The values of δ that are less than the inverse of any polynomial in the size of the database are preferable. The 
values of δ which are O(1/ ||x||1) are dangerous as it allows to show all private information of individuals from a 
very small portion of the database like ”just a few” case that we are already discussed in previous subsection. If δ 
is negligible, there are differences between (𝜖,0) and (𝜖, 𝛿)differential privacy. (𝜖,0)-differential privacy says that, 
for every run of the mechanism ℳ(𝑥), the output observed is (almost) equally likely to be observed on every 
neighboring database, simultaneously. Whereas, (𝜖,δ)-differential privacy provide us a mechanism where, for 
every pair of neighboring databases x, y, it is extremely unlikely that, ‘ex post facto’ the observed value 
ℳ(𝑥)will be much more or much less likely to be generated when the database is x than when the database is y. 
 
Intuition for Post-processing 
For an output 𝒵∼ℳ(𝑥), a database y is may be possible to find such that 𝒵 is much more likely to be produced on 
y than it is produced when in database x. Then, privacy loss can be calculated which is given below: 
 ℒℳ(𝑥)||ℳ(𝑦)
𝒵 =
𝑃(ℳ(𝑥)=𝒵)
𝑃(ℳ(𝑦)=𝒵)
  
This loss can be negative or positive. 
 
 
Probability Simplex   
Given a discrete set ℬ, the probability simplex over ℬ, denoted ∆(⁡ℬ) is defined to be: 
 ∆(ℬ) = {𝑥𝜖ℝ|ℬ| ∶ ⁡ 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0⁡∀𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∑ 𝑥𝑖 = 1
|ℬ|
𝑖=1 } 
 
  
Randomized Algorithm  
A randomized algorithm ℳ with domain 𝒜 and discrete range ℬ is associated with a mapping ℳ : 𝒜 → ∆ 
( ⁡ℬ). On input a𝜖𝒜 , the algorithm ℳ  outputs ℳ (a) = 𝑏with probability  (ℳ⁡(𝑎))𝑏  for each b𝜖⁡ℬ . The 
probability space is over the coin flips of the algorithmℳ. 
 
Theorem 
Any (𝜖,δ)-deferentially private mechanism ℳis (k𝜖 ,δ) differentially private for groups of size k. That is, for 
all ||x − y||1 ≤ k and allS ⊆Rangeℳ]  
𝑃[ℳ(𝑥)𝜖𝑆] ≤ exp⁡(𝑘𝜖)𝑃[ℳ(𝑦)𝜖𝑆] 
where the probability space is over the coin flips of the mechanism ℳ. 
 
 
 
 
  
Definitions and Theorems for the second step: 
Here we will discuss some useful definitions and background theorems that work for the second learning step 
of DP discussed in the useful background on differential privacy section in alphabetical order as instructed by 
the publisher (Dwork et. al., 2014). 
Theorems 
Additive Chernoff’s bound 
Let 𝒳1, …⁡⁡ , 𝒳𝑚 be independent random variables bounded such that 0 ≤ 𝒳𝑖 ≤ 1 for all i. Let 𝑆 = ⁡
1
𝑚
∑ 𝒳𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1  
denote their mean and let 𝜇 = ⁡𝔼[𝑆] denote their expected mean. Then: 
𝑃[𝑆 > 𝜇 + 𝜀] ≤ ⁡ ℯ−2𝑚𝜀
2
 
𝑃[𝑆 < 𝜇 − 𝜀] ≤ ⁡ ℯ−2𝑚𝜀
2
 
 
Azuma’s Inequality 
Let f be a function of m random variables 𝒳1, …⁡⁡ , 𝒳𝑚 each 𝒳𝑖  taking values from a set 𝐴𝑖  such that 𝔼[𝑓] is 
bounded. Let 𝑐𝑖 denote the maximum effect of 𝒳𝑖 on f , then for all 𝑎𝑖, 𝑎𝑖́ ⁡𝜖⁡𝐴𝑖 :  
|𝔼[𝑓⁡|⁡𝒳1, … ,𝒳𝑖−1⁡⁡,𝒳𝑖 =⁡𝑎𝑖] − ⁡𝔼[𝑓⁡|⁡𝒳1, … ,𝒳𝑖−1⁡⁡,𝒳𝑖 =⁡𝑎𝑖́ ]| ≤ ⁡ 𝑐𝑖 
Then: 
𝑃[𝑓(𝒳1, …⁡⁡ , 𝒳𝑚) ≥ ⁡𝔼[𝑓] + 𝑡] ≤ ⁡ ℯ
−(
2𝑡2
∑ 𝑐𝑖
2𝑚
𝑖=1
)
 
 
 
Exponential Mechanism  
The exponential mechanism ℳ𝐸(𝑥, 𝑢, ℛ) selects and outputs an element r𝜖ℛ⁡with probability proportional to 
exp(
𝜖𝑢(𝑥,𝑟)
2∆𝑢
). Where, sensitivity of the utility score u: ℕ|𝒳| × ℛ → ℝ and   
∆𝑢 = max
𝑟∈ℛ
max
𝑥,𝑦∈||𝑥−𝑦||≤1
||𝑢(𝑥, 𝑟) − 𝑢(𝑦, 𝑟)|| 
Claim 
The Exponential Mechanism holds (𝜖,0) differential privacy. 
 
Gaussian Mechanism  
 Just like Laplace Mechanism, it adds noise drawn from the Gaussian distribution whose variance is calibrated 
according to the sensitivity and privacy parameters. 
ℳ𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑠(𝑥, 𝑓, 𝜖, 𝛿) = 𝑓(𝑥) +𝒩
𝑑 (𝜇 = 0, 𝜎2 =
2 ln (
1.25
𝛿
) . (∆2𝑓)
2
𝜖2
) 
Claim 
ℳ𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑠 holds (𝜖,δ) differential privacy 
 
Multiplicative Chernoff’s bound 
Here the background assumption is same as the additive Chernoff’s bound. The bound is following: 
𝑃[𝑆 > 𝜇(1 + 𝜀)] ≤ ⁡ ℯ−2𝑚𝜀
2/3 
𝑃[𝑆 < 𝜇(1 − 𝜀)] ≤ ⁡ ℯ−2𝑚𝜀
2/2 
 
 
 
Noisy Max Report  
  
If we consider a simple algorithm where it determines which m counting queries has highest value, and then it 
adds generated Laplace Noise from Lap(1/𝜖) to each count and return the index of the largest noisy count. We 
can ignore the possibilities of tie. This is called Noisy Max Report. 
Claim 
The Report Noisy Max algorithm is (𝜖,0)-differentially private. 
Report One-Sided Noisy Arg-Max 
When run with parameter 𝜖/2𝛿𝑢  yields the same distribution on outputs as the exponential 
mechanism. 
Randomized Response 
It’s a simple survey process where binary responses are considered i.e. the answers should be in ‘yes’ and ‘no’ 
only. The steps are following: 
• Toss a coin 
• If the coin shows ‘tails’, then give the ‘true’ answer 
• If the coin shows ‘heads’, then again toss it and give ‘yes’ if the result is ‘heads’ or ‘no’ if the result is 
‘tails’. 
For (𝜖,δ) differentially private mechanism, to find the value of 𝜖, we obtain:        
RR = 
𝑃[𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒=YES|𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑡ℎ="𝑌𝐸𝑆"]
𝑃[𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒="𝑌𝐸𝑆"|𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑡ℎ="𝑁𝑂"]
 
where, 𝜖 = ln⁡(𝑅𝑅). 
Claim 
Randomized Response Technique holds (,0) differential privacy where 𝜖 = ln⁡(3). For more analysis, 
remarks and corollary please refer to (Dwork et. al., 2014). 
Stirling’s Approximation 
𝑛! Can be approximated by √2𝜋𝑛(
𝑛
𝑒
)𝑛. 
 
 
The Laplace Mechanism 
Given any function f: ℕ|𝒳| → ℝ𝑘, the Laplace mechanism is defined as: 
 ℳ𝐿(𝑥, 𝑓(. ), 𝜖) = 𝑓(𝑥) + (𝑌1, 𝑌2, …… , 𝑌𝑘)  
Where Yi ;i = 1:k, are i.i.d random variables drawn from Lap(∆𝑓/𝜖). 
 
Definitions and Theorems for the third step: 
 
Here we will discuss some useful definitions and background theorems that work for the third learning step of 
DP discussed in the useful background on differential privacy section in alphabetical order as instructed by the 
publisher (Dwork et. al., 2014). 
Theorems 
Accuracy  
We will say that an algorithm which outputs a stream of answers a1 , . . . , 𝜖(⊺, ⊥)∗ in response to a stream of k 
queries f1 ,..., fk is (α,β)-accurate with respect to a threshold ⊥ if except with probability at most β, the 
algorithm does not halt before fk , and  
∀ai = ⊺: 
fi(D) ≥ T − α. 
and, ∀ai = ⊥: 
  
fi(D) ≤ T + α 
 
 
Advanced Composition  
If 𝒜1, … . ,𝒜𝑘are randomised algorithm satisfying (,δ) differential privacy, then their composition, defined as 
𝒜1(𝐷),…… ,𝒜1(𝐷), 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝐷𝜖𝒟 satisfies (𝜖
′, 𝑘𝛿 + 𝛿′) differential privacy where𝜖′ = ⁡𝜖√2𝑘𝑙𝑜𝑔(1/𝛿′) +
𝑘𝜖(exp(𝜖) − 1). Moreover 𝒜i can be chosen adaptivelydepending on the outputs of 𝒜1, … . , 𝒜𝑘. 
Let, two distribution are given µ and 𝜇′, then we can say that they are (𝜖, 𝛿)- deferentially close, denoted by 
𝜇 ≅(𝜖,𝛿) 𝜇
′, if for all measurable 𝒜, we have 
exp⁡(−𝜖)(𝜇′(𝒜 − 𝛿)) ≤ 𝒜 ≤ exp⁡(𝜖)(𝜇′(𝒜 + 𝛿)) 
 
Composition 
Let ℳ𝑖: ℕ|X| → ℛ𝑖 be an (𝜖𝑖 , 𝛿𝑖) differentially private algorithm for i 𝜖 [k]. Then if⁡ℳ[𝑘] ∶ ⁡ℕ
|𝒳| → ∏ ℛ𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1  is 
defined tobe ℳ[𝑘](𝑥) = ( ℳ1(𝑥),ℳ2(𝑥)  ,…………..., ℳ𝑘(𝑥) ), then ℳ[𝑘](𝑥) is 
(∑ 𝜖𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 , ∑ 𝛿𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 ) −differentially private. 
 
 
Corollary 1  
Let ℳ𝑖 : ℕ|X| →ℛi be an (𝜖𝑖, 0) differentially private algorithm for i 𝜖 [k]. Then if ⁡ℳ[𝑘] ∶ ⁡ℕ
|𝒳| →
∏ ℛ𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1  is defined to be ℳ[𝑘](𝑥) = ( ℳ1(𝑥),ℳ2(𝑥)  ,……………, ℳ𝑘(𝑥) ), then ℳ[𝑘](𝑥) is 
(∑ 𝜖𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 , 0) − differentially private. 
 
Properties of Differential Privacy  
The notion of (𝜖,δ)differential private satisfies the following properties: 
• Monotonicity:Let. 𝜇 ≅(𝜖,𝛿) 𝜇
′Then for𝜖′ > 𝜖and𝛿′ > 𝛿, 𝜇 ≅(𝜖′,𝛿′) 𝜇
′. 
• Triangle Inequality : Let, 𝜇1 ≅(𝜖1,𝛿1) 𝜇2and  𝜇2 ≅(𝜖2,𝛿2) 𝜇3, then𝜇1 ≅(𝜖1+𝜖2,𝛿1+𝛿2) 𝜇3 
• Quasi-Convexity:Let,𝜇1 ≅(𝜖,𝛿) 𝜇1
′  and, 𝜇2 ≅(𝜖,𝛿) 𝜇2
′  then for any a 𝜖  [0,1], it holds that (1 − 𝑎)𝜇1 +
𝑎𝜇2⁡ ≅(𝜖,𝛿) (1 − 𝑎)𝜇1
′ + 𝑎𝜇2
′ ⁡. 
 
Lemma 1  
Let 𝑞 <
1
2
 and let 𝜇0 , 𝜇1  be distributions such that 𝜇1 ≅(𝜖,𝛿) 𝜇0 . For 𝜇 = (1 − 𝑞)𝜇0 + 𝑞𝜇1 , it holds 
that𝜇 ≅(𝜖′,𝑞𝛿) 𝜇0, where𝜖
′ = log⁡(𝑞(𝑒𝜖 − 1) + 1) ≤ 𝑞(𝑒𝜖 − 1). 
Max Divergence   
The Max Divergence between two random variables Y and Z taking values from the same domain is defined 
to be: 
 𝐷∝(𝑌||𝑍) = max
𝑆⊆sup(𝑌)
[𝑙𝑛
𝑃[𝑌∈𝑆]
𝑃{𝑍∈𝑆}
]  
The δ-Approximate Max Divergence between Y and Z is defined to be: 
 𝐷∝
𝛿(𝑌||𝑍) = ⁡ max
𝑆⊆sup(𝑌):𝑃(𝑌∈𝑆)≥𝛿
[ln⁡
𝑃[𝑌∈𝑆]−𝛿
𝑃[𝑍∈𝑆]
]  
Remark 1 
For a mechanism ℳ, it is to be noted: 
• It will be  differentially private necessary and sufficiently for two neighbouring database 𝑥 and 𝑦, 
𝐷∝(ℳ(𝑥)||ℳ(𝑦)) ≤ 𝜖𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷∝(ℳ(𝑦)||ℳ(𝑥)) ≤ 𝜖; and 
• It will be ( 𝜖 ,δ) private necessary and sufficiently for two neighbouring data set 𝑥  and𝑦 , 
𝐷∝
𝛿(ℳ(𝑥)||ℳ(𝑦)) ≤ 𝜖and𝐷∝
𝛿(ℳ(𝑦)||ℳ(𝑥)) ≤ 𝜖. 
𝑙1-Sensitivity  
  
The 𝑙1 sensitivity of a function f : ℕ
|𝒳| → ℝ𝑘, then:  ∆𝑓 = ⁡ max
𝑥,𝑦∈ℕ|𝒳|,||𝑥−𝑦||
1
=1
||𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑓(𝑦)||1  
𝑙2-Sensitivity  
The 𝑙2 sensitivity of a function f : ℕ
|𝒳| then: ∆2= max
𝑥,𝑦∈ℕ|𝒳|
||𝑓(𝑥) − 𝑓(𝑦)||2.  
 
  
Utility  
How much information about the real answer can be obtained from the reported one by a specific model[18], 
is called the utility. How the utility works can be defined by the figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
